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749 days after the referendum, and 470 days after Article 50 was 
triggered, the UK government has produced the White Paper “The 
Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union” with its negotiation position in the Brexit negotiations. This is 
the first formal statement of the UK’s negotiation stance in the Brexit 
process. 
The White paper, which has prompted the resignation of two senior 
cabinet members, takes a “softer” form of Brexit than many in the 
Leave camp had hoped, but has been welcomed by advocates of a 
closer relationship with the EU. In an interview with The Sun, 
however, President Trump said that the closer relationship with the 
EU would likely make a trade deal with the USA more difficult. It also 
appears that both the EU negotiators and the WTO have reservations 
regarding the proposed settlement. 
The White Paper covers four areas: the economic partnership, the 
security partnership, cross-cutting and other cooperation and 
institutional arrangements. The proposed arrangement is a free trade 
area for goods (including agricultural products), with the UK collecting 
tariffs for goods ultimately headed to the EU when they enter the UK, 
in order to allow free trade in goods between the UK and the EU 
under what is termed the Facilitated Customs Arrangement. However, 
the UK still wants to leave the Common Fisheries Policy, returning to 
the status quo prior to the 1888 North Sea Fisheries Convention. 
As part of the free trade area for goods, the UK would follow the EU 
rulebook for goods, including membership (albeit without voting rights) 
of some EU standards agencies, as well as in areas such as fair 
competition, environmental standards, labour practices and other 
areas. 
This could allow the UK to set its own tariff levels and make free trade 
agreements with other counties, although it would be restricted in 
some ways by following EU regulations in goods. However, there will 
be more regulatory freedom for services under this proposal, but with 
less market access for the UK to the EU – something which has 
received criticism from some areas, notably the City of London. 
The White Paper does advocate the general provisions to lower tariffs 
on services, in line with the World Trade Organisation General 
Agreement on Trade in Services obligations, with provisions for the 
mutual recognition pf qualifications. Professional and business 
services and the financial sector are mentioned specifically, with 
suggestions to allow the joint practice of UK-EU lawyers and joint UK-
EU ownership of accounting firms for the former, and a regulatory 
equivalence scheme for the latter. 
The White Paper also covers other areas where the UK and the EU 
could work together in the future, including cooperation on security 
matters such as counter-terrorism, organised crime, defence, cyber 
security and data protection. The UK also wishes to maintain 
relationships with the EU in areas of science and culture, seeking to 
retain participation in programmes such as the Horizon programme 
and Erasmus, as well as continuing as a member of the Galileo 
project, something which has become a point of some contention 
between the UK and the EU in recent months. 
Some of the institutional arrangements needed to make the proposed 
relationship work are set out in the White Paper. Although the UK 
maintains that it will no longer be under the jurisdiction of the ECJ 
after Brexit, instead suggesting that an alternative institutional 
structure is formed, such as in the Canada CETA deal or that forms 
part of NAFTA, it does suggest that the UK joins the Lugano 
convention, which covers jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters. The 
institutional structure would also involve looking at case law from the 
ECJ in the UK, and British courts in the EU, in order that the rules are 
applied consistently across both the UK and the EU. 
The EU is likely to have objections to the proposed arrangement, for 
example whether it does indeed resolve the issue of the Northern 
Ireland border, as the government contends it does. The apparent 
aspiration of the EU to provide a “no hard border” solution to the land 
border between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland 
raises a number of fundamental questions that remain unresolved. 
Most noticeably, the EU proposal seems to violate the basic principle, 
as explained to the Catalans, of the inviolability of the territorial 
integrity of its member states. This would not seem to be the case 
with regard of the Northern Ireland province proposal, and could 
stimulate currently quiescent separatist movements across the EU. 
Moreover, if Northern Ireland is to receive differential treatment, why 
not Wales, Scotland, London and the Midlands? Furthermore, for a 
supra-national entity such as the EU to effectively challenge the 
Treaty of Westphalia conventions (1648) and the provisions of UN 
membership, indicates the complexity of the issues ignored by the 
Good Friday Agreement – largely because they were not apparent 
when that settlement was reached. 
The EU is also likely to object to the UK effectively staying in the 
Single Market for goods without accepting the other forms of freedom 
for capital and labour. They also seem to be uncertain about how the 
Facilitated Customs Arrangement will work in practice – particularly 
with regard to the technology required to make the border work. In 
practice, the arrangement could make it difficult for the UK to strike 
FTAs with other countries after Brexit, especially in goods. There is 
more scope for negotiation with services, but FTAs covering services 
are less common. 
 
